Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system proposed by Nakamoto in 2008. The bitcoin backbone protocol has been analyzed in some depth: the blockchain growth property quantifies the number of blocks added to the blockchain during any time intervals; the blockchain quality property ensures the honest miners always contribute at least a certain fraction of the blockchain; the common prefix property ensures if a block is deep enough, it must be adopted by all honest miners with high probability. The Prism protocol was recently proposed to dramatically improve the blockchain throughput while maintaining the same level of security. Prior analyses of the bitcoin and Prism backbone protocols assume the lifespan of blockchain is finite. This paper presents a streamlined and strengthened analysis in synchronous networks without the finite lifespan assumption. Specifically, the results include a blockchain growth property, a blockchain quality property, and a common prefix property of the bitcoin backbone protocol, as well as the liveness and persistence of the Prism backbone protocol regardless of whether the blockchains have finite lifespan. The properties take the form of explicit expressions in lieu of order optimal results. * The authors are with the
Introduction

The bitcoin backbone protocol
Bitcoin is an electronic payment system introduced by Nakamoto [1] in 2008. The system is built on a distributed ledge technology commonly referred to as blockchain. Miners are distributed parties who generate blocks and maintain their own version of the blockchain. A blockchain is a finite sequence of blocks adopted by some miner at some point in time. It be-gins with a genesis block, and every subsequent block contains a cryptographic hashing of the previous block. In order to generate a valid new block, a miner need to find a nonce whose hash values satisfies a difficulty requirement. The process of finding such a nonce is called mining. An honest miner follows the honest chain rule, i.e., it always adopts the longest blockchain it heard about and mines on top of the longest blockchain. Since all miners work simultaneously, it is possible that two or more different blocks are mined and announced at around the same time. Then different honest miners may extend different blockchains depending on which longest one they hear first. This phenomenon is called forking. Forking of a blockchain challenges network consensus and presents opportunities for double spending attack, namely, a transaction included in the longest fork is not included in a different fork that overtakes the first fork to become the longest one.
Nakamoto [1] characterized the race between the honest miners and an adversary with less than half of the total mining power as a random walk with a drift. Nakamoto showed that the probability the adversary blockchain overtakes the honest miner's consensus blockchain vanishes exponentially over time. Nakamoto argued that the bitcoin protocol is safe under double spending attack as long as one considers a transaction confirmed only after enough new blocks are mined to extend the honest blockchain. An in-depth analysis of the bitcoin protocol was given in [2] . Several important properties of the bitcoin backbone protocol have been proposed in [1, [3] [4] [5] [6] . Garay, Kiayias, and Leonardos [3] gave a formal description and analysis of the bitcoin backbone protocol assuming a fully synchronous network, namely, mining takes place in rounds and at the end of each round, all miners see all published blocks. Under this model, [3] introduced a common prefix property and a blockchain quality property. The common prefix property states if a block is k blocks deep in an honest miner's blockchain, then the probability that the block is not included by all other honest miners' blockchain decreases exponentially with k. The blockchain quality property states the honest miners always contribute at least a certain percentage of the blockchain regardless of the strategy of adversarial parties. Then, [4] introduced a blockchain growth property, which quantifies the number of blocks added to the blockchain during any time intervals.
Moreover, Nakamoto's analysis was improved in [5] to address selfish mining. In this case, selfish miners can introduce disagreement between honest miners and split their hashing power. Selfish miners thus enhance their relative hashing power to win disproportionate rewards. This strategy, however, is not designed for double spending purposes.
The bitcoin backbone protocol gives birth to numerous "robust public transaction ledger" protocols [7, 8] . The preceding properties guarantee two fundamental properties of a robust public transaction ledger: liveness and persistence. Due to the blockchain growth property and the blockchain quality property, blocks originating from honest miners will eventually end up at a level of more than k blocks of an honest miner's blockchain. Due to the common prefix property, an honest miner's k-deep block remains permanent.
The bitcoin backbone protocol can also be leveraged to solve other problems. For example, the bitcoin backbone protocol ensures some basic properties for some randomized Byzantine agreement protocols [9-13].
The Prism protocol
The throughput of bitcoin is limited by design to ensure security [14] . As mining rate increases, blocks are more likely to be mined and announced simultaneously, i.e., forking is more likely to occur. Due to the longest blockchain rule, only the blocks on the longest blockchain will eventually be adopted by honest miners, and other honest blocks are wasted. Then the adversarial miners compete with fewer honest miners. To avoid forking, the average time interval between new blocks is set to be much longer than the latency for propagating a block to most miners in the network [15] .
Many ideas have been proposed to improve the blockchain throughput while maintaining its security. One way is to deal with high-forking blockchains by optimizing the forking rule. For example, GHOST chooses the main blockchain according to the heaviest tree rule instead of the longest blockchain rule [15] . Inclusive, Spectre, and Phantom construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structured blockchain by introducing reference links between blocks in addition to the parent links [16] [17] [18] . However, these protocols are vulnerable to certain attacks [19, 20] . Generally speaking it is very challenging to make high-forking protocols secure.
Another line of work is to decouple the various functionalities of the blockchain. For example, Bit-coinNG divides the bitcoin blockchain's operations into leader selection and transaction serialization [7] . In BitcoinNG, time is divided into epochs. During each epoch, a leader is chosen to order the transaction blocks of that epoch. However, this protocol is vulnerable to bribery or targeted attacks to leaders. In Fruitchain, transactions (fruits) are also decoupled from proposer blocks. However, fruitchain focuses on enhancing fairness instead of improving throughput [21] .
Following the spirit of decoupling blocks' functionalities, Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath [8] proposed the Prism protocol, which is a structured-DAG blockchain with one proposer blockchain and many voter blockchains. The voter blocks elect a leader block at each level of the proposer blockchain by voting. The sequence of leader blocks concludes the contents of all voter blocks, and finalizes the ledger. Each voter blockchain mines independently at a low mining rate. A voter blockchain follows the bitcoin protocol to provide security to leader election process.
With this design, the throughput (containing the content of all voter blocks) is decoupled from the mining rate of each voter blockchain. Slow mining rate guarantees the security of each voter blockchain as well as the proposer blockchain. Prism achieves security against up to 50% adversarial hashing power, optimal throughput up to the capacity of the network, and fast confirmation latency for honest transactions. A thorough description and analysis is shown in [8] .
Our results
Previous analysis on the backbone of bitcoin and Prism assumes a blockchain's lifespan is finite, i.e., there exists a maximum round when the blockchain ends. For example, in [3, 6] and [8] , the good properties of blockchain hold only under typical events, i.e., the number of honest and adversarial blocks mined must not deviate too much from their expected value over all long enough time intervals. The probability of typical events was shown to depend on the blockchain's maximum round parameter. Indeed, the probability of the blockchain growth property, the blockchain quality property, and the common prefix property are all expressed implicitly in terms of the blockchain's maximum round.
In this paper, we drop the finite lifespan assumption and prove strong properties of the bitcoin backbone protocol. We define the typical events with respect to each interval: instead of requiring the number of honest and adversarial blocks to be typical over all long enough time intervals, we only require them to be typical over all time intervals that contain a certain interval that includes the transaction of interest. Since the probability that the number of honest and adversarial blocks are "atypical" decreases exponentially with interval length, the sum of the probabilities over all those intervals remains vanishingly small. Thus we provide performance guarantees that are truly permanent whether or not the blockchain have a finite lifespan. Moreover, without the finite lifespan assumption, we express the properties of the bitcoin backbone protocol in explicit expressions in lieu of order optimality results in some previous analysis. The explicit expressions provide tighter bounds and more practical references to public transaction ledger protocol design.
In [8] , liveness and consistency properties of the Prism protocol were proved assuming a finite life span of the blockchains [8] . In this paper, we also prove the liveness and consistency of the Prism protocol without the finite lifespan assumption.
Due to space limitations, the proof of some results are relegated to a longer version of this paper [22] .
Model and definitions
We assume the total number of miners is n, among which t miners are adversarial and the remaining miners are honest. Assume all miners have equal hash powers (if not, we assume they can be split into equal-power pieces). Let
denote the percentage of adversarial miners. We assume adversarial miners collectively have less than 1 2 of the total mining power in the blockchain network, so β ∈ [0, 1 2 ).
We adopt a discrete model where activities take place in rounds. If a miner publishes one or more blocks in a round, all miners receive the block(s) at exactly the end of the round (a miner can only react to round r blocks in round r + 1). Evidently, by the end of each round, all honest miners are fully synchronized. If a block is mined by an honest miner, we call it an honest block; otherwise the block is called an adversarial block. We assume that during round 0, a single honest block, called the genesis block, is mined and broadcast to all miners. For r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let H[r] denote the number of all honest blocks mined during round r. The mining difficulty and miner' mining powers are adjusted to be constant in all rounds r ≥ 1.
Without loss of generality, the mining power of all miners are and the mining difficulty are assumed to remain constant, such that the probability that an honest miner mines a new block in every round r ≥ 1 is equal to p ∈ (0, 1). 1 Note that H[r] ∼ Binomial(n −t, p). Define
indicates if one or more honest blocks are mined during round r or not. Let
Then
upper bound the number of adversarial blocks mined during round r (the adversarial miners may or may not publish them). Then
It is important to note that H [1] , H [2] , . . . are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), which form a stationary process. The same can be said of the X, Y , and Z sequences. Define
Then ξ ∈ (0, 1]. For all integers s and r satisfying 1 ≤ s < r, let
which represents the total number of honest blocks mined during rounds s, . . . , r − 1. To be consistent with this notation, we mean all rounds up to and including r − 1 when we say "by round r". Likewise, we define
Definition 1. By a blockchain we mean a finite sequence of blocks adopted by some miner at some point in time which begins with a genesis block and that every subsequent block contains a cryptographic hashing of the previous block. It is assumed that no block can be mined in an earlier round than its immediate predecessor.
A blockchain's prefix is also a blockchain. A blockchain must have the following properties: 1) Its blocks must be mined in order; 2) it is immutable in the sense that it is computationally impossible for any miner to mine a different blockchain that has the same genesis block and the same final block.
Definition 2. If a blockchain is adopted by an honest miner by some round, it is said to be honest.
It is assumed that, the mining difficulty is adjusted such that q ≤ ξ 6 .
The bitcoin backbone protocol
We will make heavy use of Bernoulli's inequality: 
Proposition 4. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
Proposition 5. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 can be proved based on Proposition 3. Proposition 6. For r = 1, 2, . . . ,
Proposition 6 can be proved based on Proposition 5.
where
Under event E 1 [s, r], the number of rounds with honest block mined, X[s, r], does not deviate from its expected value by more than a fraction of ξ 6 . Under event E 2 [s, r], the number of uniquely successful rounds Y [s, r] is no less than 1 − ξ 6 of its expected value. Under event E 3 [s, r], the upper bound for the number of adversarial blocks is no more than its expected value plus ξ 6 of the expectation of X[s, r]. Intuitively, under E[s, r], we have 1) a "typical" number of rounds during which at least one honest block is mined, 2)"enough" uniquely successful rounds, and 3) the total number of adversarial blocks is limited.
Proposition 8. (Chernoff bound, page 69 in [23] ) Let X ∼ binomial(n, p). Then for every δ ∈ (0, 1],
and
Define
Lemma 9. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r,
where γ is given in (21) .
Lemma 9 can be proved based on Propositions 5, 6, and 8. 
Lemma 10 can be proved based on Propositions 4, 5, and 6. 
The event G[s, r] occurs when the events E[s − a, r + b] simultaneously occurs for all a, b, i.e., the "E" events occur over all intervals that contain [s, r]. The event G represents a collection of outcomes that constrain the number of blocks mined in all intervals that contain [s, r], including arbitrarily large intervals that terminate in the arbitrarily far future. Intuitively, we have defined G[s, r] to allow the "good" properties mentioned in Lemma 10 to extend to all intervals containing [s, r] under the event. It is important to note that the typical events defined in [3, 8] requires the interval to be bounded by b < r max where r max denotes a finite execution lifespan. In contrast, the typical event is defined in this paper to allow for results for infinite lifespan.
Lemma 12. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r, 
where (31) is due to (23) . According to Lemma 15, the blockchain growth for any honest miner is at least
Let len(C) denote the length of a blockchain C. Let C k denote the k-deep prefix of blockchain C. If len(C) ≤ k, let C k be the genesis block.
Definition 19. Let G be an event and r be a positive integer. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said to be permanent after round r under G if, under event G, the block or sequence remains in all honest blockchains starting from round r.
Definition 20. Let r be a positive integer. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said to be ε-permanent after round r if, there exists an event G with P(G) > 1 − ε such that the block or sequence is permanent after round r under G.
Lemma 21. If a bock or a sequence is ε-permanent after round s, then it is also ε-permanent after round r for every r > s. 
The Prism backbone protocol
The Prism protocol is invented and fully described in [8] . Here we describe the Prism backbone with just enough details to facilitate its analysis. We assume m + 1 genesis blocks are generated for the same number of blockchains during round 0 by honest miners. Blockchain 0 is referred to as the proposer blockchain. The remaining blockchains are voter blockchains. A block is mined before knowing which blockchain it will be part of. Sortition relies on the range the nonce's hash lands in: If a miner find a nonce whose hash is within [ jα, jα + α) for j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the mined block belongs to blockchain i. Mining difficulty can be adjusted by changing parameter α. This sortition scheme ensures the mining power of both honest and adversarial miners are evenly distributed across different voting blockchains and the proposer blockchain.
To certify its level, a new honest voter block for blockchain j ( j = 1, 2, . . . , m) points to blockchain j's maximum-level block by a parent link (ties are broken by predefined rules). To certify its level, an honest new proposer block includes the hash of a maximumlevel block in the proposer blockchain and point to it by a reference link. In addition, an honest new proposer includes one reference link to every existing block in both proposer and voter blockchains that has not been pointed to by other reference links.
Following the bitcoin protocol, an honest miner decides each main voter blockchain by the longest blockchain rule. The miner determines the its main blockchain by votes from the main voter blockchains. Let B be an honest block on a voter blockchain j. By B's ancestors we mean all blocks on B's path to the blockchain genesis block following parent links. By saying B votes for a level l, we mean B chooses one proposer block among all proposer blocks at level l according to a predefined rule, and points to its choice with a reference link. An honest voter block votes for all levels which have not been voted by its ancestors.
A voter blockchain is allowed to vote only once for each level (more votes from the same voter blockchain are discarded). That is to say, proposer blocks on the same level receive m votes in total. At each level, the proposer block with most votes is elected as a leader block, with ties broken by a predefined rule. The sequence of leader blocks over all levels is called the leader sequence. A miner generates its final ledger based on its leader sequence.
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m and r = 1, 2, . . . , let H j [r] denote the total number of honest blocks mined during round r for blockchain j. Following the definitions in Section 3, for j = 0, 1, . . . , m and r = 1, 2, . . ., we also define
and let Z j [r] be the total number adversarial blocks mined for blockchain j during round r. 
We note that for integers 0 ≤ j ≤ m and r ≥ 1, 
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 10. (43)
Lemma 26. For all integers 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m,
where γ is defined in (21) .
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 12.
Since the proposer blockchain and all voter blockchains grow in the same manner as how a bitcoin blockchain grows, the blockchain growth lemma and blockchain growth theorem remain valid:
Lemma 27. Let 1 ≤ s < r and 0 ≤ j ≤ m be integers. Suppose an honest voter blockchain j is of length l by round s. Then by round r, the length of every honest voter blockchain j is at least l + X j [s, r].
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 15. For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Lemma 16.
Theorem 29. (Blockchain growth theorem for voter and proposer blockchain) Let r, s, s 1 be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s 1 ≤ s < r. Let j be an integer satisfying 0 ≤ j ≤ m. Then under typical event G j [s, r], the length of every honest miner's blockchain j must grow by at least (1 − ξ 6 )q(r − s 1 ) during rounds {s 1 , . . . , r}. For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 17.
Since the protocol for voter blockchains is identical to that of bitcoin, the blockchain quality theorem and the common prefix theorem hold for all voter blockchains.
Theorem 30. (Blockchain quality theorem for voter blockchain) Let r, s, k, j be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r, k ≥ 2q(r − s) and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Suppose an honest blockchain has more than k blocks by round r. Under event G j [s, r], at least ξ 2 fraction of the last k blocks of this blockchain j are honest.
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 18.
Theorem 31. (Common prefix theorem for voter blockchain) Let r, s, k, j be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r, k ≥ 2q(r − s) and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. If by round r an honest voter blockchain j has a k prefix, then the prefix is permanent after round r under G j [s, r].
For j = 0, 1, . . . , m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof as that for Theorem 22.
Since the leader sequence of the proposer blockchain is decided by votes instead of the longest blockchain rule, the blockchain quality theorem and common prefix theorem do not immediately extend to the leader sequence of the proposer blockchain.
Define R l to be the round in which the first proposer block on level l is mined. Define
where γ is given by (21) . We let LedSeq l (r) denote the proposer blockchain's leader sequence up to level l by round r.
Lemma 32. Consider a given level l. Let k be a positive integer. If by some round r > max k 2q , R l + 1 , every voter blockchain contains at least one honest block mined after round R l which is at least k-deep, then LedSeq l (r) is ε k -permanent after round r.
Lemma 32 can be proved based on Theorem 31 and Lemma 26.
Lemma 33. If positive integers R, r, and k satisfy r ≥ 2(k + 1)
then right before round R + r, with probability at least 1 − ε k , all honest voter blockchains have an honest block mined after round R which is at least k deep.
Lemma 33 can be proved based on Theorem 29, Lemma 26, and Theorem 30.
Theorem 34. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). Let R l be the round during which the first proposer block on level l is mined. For every integer r ≥ 5
the leader sequence up to level l is ε−permanent after round R l + r.
Theorem 34 can be proved based on Lemmas 33, 32, and 21.
Theorem 35. (Blockchain quality theorem for proposer blockchain) Let r, s, k be integers satisfying 1 ≤ s < r and k ≥ 2q(r − s). Suppose an honest proposer blockchain has more than k leader blocks by round r. Under event G 0 [s, r], by round r, at least ξ 2 fraction of the last k leader blocks of the proposer blockchain are honest.
Theorem 35 can be proved based on Lemma 28.
Definition 36. A transaction tx is honest if it has been broadcast, and no other transaction spending from the same unspent output has been broadcast.
Note that the notion of honesty is applicable only to transactions which have been broadcast.
Definition 37. A transaction is said to be ε-permanent after round r if, with probability at least 1−ε, it remains on the final ledger of every honest miner after round r.
Lemma 38. Suppose right before round r, the leader block on level l is honest. Suppose this leader block is mined during round R. If an honest transaction enters a block and the block is broadcast by round R, then every honest miner's final ledger generated by LedSeq l (r) will include this honest transaction.
Theorem 39. For every ε > 0 and every integer r ≥ 25
an honest transaction that enters into a block is εpermanent r rounds after the block is broadcast.
Theorem 39 can be proved based on Lemmas 26, 28, and 38, and Theorems 29, 34, and 35.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the bitcoin and the Prism backbone protocols in synchronous networks. Unlike in prior work we allow the blockchains to have unlimited lifespan. We have established a blockchain growth property, a blockchain quality property, and a common prefix property for the bitcoin backbone protocol. We have also proved a blockchain growth property and a blockchain quality property of the leader sequence in the Prism protocol. We have shown that the leader sequence is permanent with high probability after sufficient amount of wait time. As a consequnce, every honest transaction will eventually enter the final ledger and become permanent with probability higher than 1 − ε after a confirmation time proportional to log 1 ε . All the preceding properties take the form of explicit bounds in lieu of order optimality, which provide better guidance to public transaction ledger protocol design.
